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Abstract
The purpose of our paper is to explore the different views of the issues of international labor
standards and to explore the available options for addressing these issues. We conclude that: (1)
there is no convincing case on theoretical or empirical grounds for incorporating labor standards
into the WTO and into U.S. trade agreements; (2) the surest way to improve labor standards is
for the United States and other industrialized countries to maintain open markets and to encourage
the economic growth of their developing country trading partners; and (3) steps should be taken to
support the activities of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to provide inducements and
technical assistance to help developing countries raise their labor standards.
1. Introduction
The interaction of labor standards and international trade policy is by no means
a new issue. Nonetheless it has assumed new importance due to the increas-
ingly vocal arguments by labor interests and social activists in the United States
that issues of “unfair’’ labor practices and conditions have been ignored in both
U.S. trade policies and in multilateral trade negotiations and therefore should
be placed high on the U.S. national and multilateral trade policy agenda. Issues
of lax enforcement of labor standards in Mexico were at the center of the public
debate in the United States especially in 1992–93 when the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was being negotiated and later submitted for
approval by the U.S. Congress. Efforts were also made (unsuccessfully) at
the December 1996 World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting in
Singapore to extend the WTO to include rules governing trade-related labor
standards. Labor standards were again at issue in the fast-track authority that
the Clinton Administration requested from Congress in November 1997 and
then withdrew because of insufficient support from House Democrats.
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The concern of labor and social activists is that the increased imports from
countries in which labor standards are ostensibly not enforced at a sufficiently
high level will be detrimental to wages and working conditions in the United
States and other industrialized countries. As we will note in our discussion
that follows, there is a wide disparity of views on issues of international labor
standards. The purpose of this paper is to explore these different views and
the available options for addressing the issues involved. We conclude that: (1)
there is no convincing case for incorporating labor standards into the WTO and
into U.S. trade agreements; (2) the surest way to improve labor standards is for
the United States and other industrialized countries to maintain open markets
and to encourage the growth of their developing country trading partners; and
(3) steps should be taken to support the activities of the International Labour
Organization (ILO) to provide inducements and technical assistance to help
developing countries raise their labor standards.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the definition and
scope of labor standards. Theoretical aspects of the economic effects of la-
bor standards are considered in Section 3, while Section 4 summarizes the
available empirical evidence. The monitoring and enforcement of labor stan-
dards are discussed in Section 5. Conclusions and implications for policy are
presented in Section 6.
2. Definition and scope of labor standards
Labor standards are multi-faceted and may vary from country to country de-
pending on the stage of development, per capita income, and political, social,
and cultural conditions and institutions. It may be difficult therefore to distin-
guish unambiguously those labor standards that everyone would consider to
be universal human rights from other labor standards that will depend on given
national circumstances. Nonetheless, efforts have been made to identify and
achieve consensus on a group of so-called core labor standards which ideally
should apply universally. For example, according to OECD (1996, p. 26), core
labor standards include: (1) prohibition of forced labor; (2) freedom of associ-
ation; (3) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (4) elimination of child
labor exploitation; and (5) nondiscrimination in employment.
Agreement on the universality of these core labor standards derives from the
widespread acceptance and ratification of United Nations Covenants and Con-
ventions as well as acceptance (though not necessarily ratification) of the per-
tinent Conventions of the ILO that deal with human rights and labor standards.1
Besides the aforementioned core standards, there are other labor standards
that are less universally accepted, and that relate to “acceptable conditions
of work,’’ which include: a minimum wage; limitations on hours of work; and
occupational safety and health in the workplace.2
To illustrate some of the difficulties that may arise in interpreting and imple-
menting core standards and distinguishing between core and other standards,
it is interesting to note what Fields (1995, p. 13) has proposed as “...a set of
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basic labour rights for workers throughout the world:
(i) No person has the right to enslave another or to cause another to enter
into indentured servitude, and every person has the right to freedom from
such conditions.
(ii) No person has the right to expose another to unsafe or unhealthy working
conditions without the fullest possible information.
(iii) Children have the right not to work long hours whenever their families’
financial circumstances allow.
(iv) Every person has the right to freedom of association in the workplace
and the right to organise and bargain collectively with employers.’’
To illustrate further, Aggarwal (1995, pp. 4–5) has proposed that a distinction
be drawn between standards related to labor processes and standards related
to labor outcomes. This distinction would apply some definition of what con-
stitutes a “minimum’’ standard to the determination of basic worker rights in
terms of labor processes. Presumably, the point of taking labor processes,
rather than outcomes, into account is to make allowance for differences and
changes over time in the level of economic development and related factors.
What remains unclear, however, as Aggarwal acknowledges, is the difficulty of
deciding whether the identification and guarantee of labor processes provide
an effective pre-condition for attaining the minimum criteria associated with
achieving labor outcomes.
While, as already mentioned, there is concern in the United States that many
of its developing country trading partners appear to be violating certain basic
worker rights,3 it has been pointed out, for example, by Bhagwati (1995, pp. 754–
55; 1997) that the United States is itself open to criticism when it comes to the
realization of several labor standards. He argues accordingly that it is “morally
obtuse’’ for the United States to seek to impose on poor countries particular
requirements relating to worker rights, while not extending these efforts to its
own problems in the proposed international standards.4
The foregoing discussion is by no means intended to deny the desirability
of improving working conditions through higher labor standards. The issue,
rather, is how this can best be accomplished. We shall have more to say on this
below in discussing existing institutions and mechanisms for the monitoring
and enforcement of labor standards. It may be useful first though to discuss
the central theoretical issues and the available empirical evidence involved in
analyzing the economic effects of labor standards.
3. Economic effects of labor standards: Theoretical considerations
In this section, we consider two main issues: (1) the diversity of labor standards
and the case for free trade; and (2) the effects of standards and the international
harmonization of standards on economic welfare and the terms of trade of
individual nations.
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Diversity of standards and the case for free trade
As noted in the preceding discussion, labor standards may vary across nations
depending on their level of development, per capita incomes, and a host of
political, social, and cultural conditions and institutions. The issue is whether
such diversity of standards alters the case for free trade. This has been investi-
gated in depth by Srinivasan (1995, 1997), based on a theoretical model in which
standards use productive resources and also affect consumer welfare. The up-
shot of Srinivasan’s theoretical analysis is that the diversity of labor standards
between nations will reflect differences in factor endowments and levels of in-
come, and that such diversity is consistent with the case for free trade. If mini-
mum international labor standards are to be attained, it will be necessary to have
arrangements for international income transfers and domestic tax/subsidies.
This will be the case as well when consumers in countries with high standards
have a moral preference to raise standards in their trading-partner countries.
Further, if there are market failures that prevent the attainment of minimum la-
bor standards, income transfers and domestic tax/subsidies will be required
to achieve optimal conditions for resource allocation and consumer welfare.5
Finally, the use of trade intervention could hinder the attainment of higher labor
standards, and it may be in the collective interests of countries to cooperate in
setting labor standards. We shall have occasion below to examine the implica-
tions of Srinivasan’s conclusions in considering the different options for dealing
with international differences in labor standards.
International harmonization of standards
Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (BDS) (1996) analyze the effects of standards on
economic welfare and the terms of trade and do not concern themselves directly
with issues of the diversity of standards and the case for free trade. They employ
a variety of theoretical models in which different national characteristics may
determine the outcome of the introduction of labor standards.6
A general conclusion emerging from the BDS analysis is that economic wel-
fare is best served when countries act to correct their domestic (labor) market
failures. But, since these market failures will likely differ between countries,
there is no obvious case on welfare grounds for pursuing universal standards
and the international harmonization of standards that this may imply. This con-
clusion is consistent with that of Srinivasan, namely that diversity of working
conditions between nations is the norm and is by no means in itself “unfair’’ so
long as the extant labor standards are consistent with efficient resource use.7
Further, despite the good intentions of government, it may well turn out that the
imposition of labor standards may fail to correct a market failure if the prefer-
ences of workers are heterogeneous with respect to what they consider to be
acceptable levels of, say, health and safety conditions in the workplace.8
In considering the economic consequences that may result from pursuing
the international harmonization of labor standards, BDS conclude that in cases
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in which low-income countries are relatively labor abundant, harmonization of
child labor and certain other standards will reduce the effective labor endow-
ment of these countries and thereby the supply of labor-intensive production
on the world market. This could improve (worsen) the terms of trade of the low
(high) income countries, although this is not what the high-income countries
may intend.
BDS further assess arguments for having standards imposed on low-income
countries. They note that low-income countries might benefit in case a gov-
ernment is unable for domestic political reasons to enact legislation on its own,
although this presumes that the policy in question will indeed correct a market
failure. Another possibility is that requiring the guarantee of such standards as
the right of workers to organize may serve to reinforce development of demo-
cratic institutions. Finally, they ask if there is any justification for high-income
countries to take countervailing actions against the ostensibly unfair labor stan-
dards of their trading partners. They answer in the negative so long as resources
are being employed efficiently. If, nonetheless, a high-income country imposes
a tariff or quota on labor-intensive imports from a low-income country, this will
obviously be harmful to the economic interests of workers in the low-income
country. In general then, the case for international harmonization of labor stan-
dards appears rather weak, and it is quite possible that harmonization could
have unintended adverse consequences for the very people they are intended
to protect. Based on the BDS analysis, it is difficult therefore to generate much
theoretical support for pursuit of core labor standards that would have universal
application.
Labor standards as private/public goods
We have already indicated that there may be a strong moral basis motivating the
pursuit of higher labor standards.9 Thus, in his analysis noted above, Srinivasan
made allowance for moral considerations so that consumers could express their
concern by a willingness to pay relatively higher prices for goods and services
that reflected higher labor standards. In this connection, there is an issue of
whether labor standards are to be considered as public or private goods. As
long as the same standards appear in the utility functions of more than one
individual, the standards are public goods. Suppose, on the other hand, that
individual consumers have a sense of virtuousness and derive pleasure from
believing that the good they are consuming embodies some acceptably high
level of labor standards. In this case, individual consumers care only about their
own satisfaction and not about others, so that labor standards can be treated
as private goods.
This view of higher standards as private goods has been expressed most
forcefully by Freeman (1994a), who argues that a market solution based on
labeling may be an especially effective way to raise labor standards internation-
ally. He makes the point that labeling has the advantage that consumers pay
more for what they consider morally acceptable, and at the same time foreign
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suppliers are compensated for their increased costs. Labeling also undercuts
protectionist influences.10
It is not altogether clear, however, that labor standards should be consid-
ered to be private goods that lend themselves to a market-based treatment
dependent on supplying all relevant information to consumers. If instead, labor
standards take the form of public goods, Freeman (p. 30) acknowledges that
some type of government intervention may be called for.11 In their theoretical
analyses, Srinivasan and Brown, Deardorff and Stern considered cases of do-
mestic market failure in which a governmentally imposed tax/subsidy arrange-
ment would be introduced to correct the distortion and permit the first-best
optimum to be attained. While tax/subsidy (price-based) arrangements have a
clear theoretical appeal, it is important to recognize in dealing with issues of
labor standards that governments often prefer to use nonprice measures, i.e.,
legal regulation and enforcement.12 Freeman (p. 29) cites a number of regulatory
examples in U.S. law, including prohibition of slavery, restrictions on child labor,
occupational health and safety standards, and discrimination in the workplace.
As he argues, the choice of different policy measures will depend on given em-
pirical and institutional circumstances, and it is likely that some combination of
price-based and regulatory approaches will produce the best results.
Political economy aspects of international labor standards
In discussing the sources of support for governmental action on labor stan-
dards, it is important to identify the constituent interest groups involved. Thus, it
would appear that in the United States organized labor, import-competing firms,
and human-rights and public-interest groups are the main proponents of stricter
labor standards applied to low-income countries. These interest groups may
often recommend policies, including sanctions and import restrictions, which
are intended ostensibly to change the behavior of trading-partner governments.
By the same token, interest groups are influential in many low-income coun-
tries, especially among unionized workers in manufacturing sectors, employees
of state enterprises, and owners/managers of import-competing firms. These
groups may seek to protect and enhance their own ends and to resist foreign
intrusion in setting standards. Krueger (1997, p. 283) characterizes the pro-
tectionist motivation as the “prevailing political economy view of international
labor standards.’’13,14 The issue then is how governments choose to respond
to the various interest groups.
4. Economic effects of labor standards: Empirical evidence
Labor standards and trade
In our earlier discussion, we distinguished “core’’ and “other’’ labor standards.
The question then is the extent to which international differences in the various
standards affect trade performance.
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Rodrik (1996) represents an especially noteworthy effort to determine whether
labor standards matter for trade. Using a variety of measures of labor stan-
dards and factor endowments, based on information for the 1980s and 1990s
Rodrik first investigated whether labor standards affect labor costs. Making
allowance for the effects of worker productivity in a sample of 36 countries,
he found that per capita income was strongly correlated with labor costs and
hence higher labor standards. Turning next to the effects on trade, he found
that only the factor endowment (comparative advantage) variables were statisti-
cally significant and that none of the labor standard indicators were statistically
significant.
Another study of interest is Aggarwal (1995), who investigated in detail the
relationships of labor standards and the pattern of U.S. imports from ten major
developing countries that accounted for 26.5 percent of U.S. imports in 1994.
Aggarwal’s major findings (p. 7) were as follows:
“Sectors typically identified as having egregious labor conditions do not oc-
cupy the only or even the primary share of these countries’ exports.
Comparisons across more export-oriented and less export-oriented sectors
indicate that core labor standards are often lower in less export-oriented or
non-traded sectors such as agriculture and services.
Similarly, within an export-oriented sector, labor conditions in firms more in-
volved in exporting are either similar to or better than those in firms that are
less involved in exporting.
Changes in technology and the structure of international trade are leading
developing countries to compete in a race upward in terms of product quality
rather than a race downward with respect to price.
...Wages and working conditions in developing countries have been exhibit-
ing positive trends. In general, these have been in line with productivity
changes.’’15
Finally, we may cite some of the main conclusions from the OECD study of
Trade, Employment and Labour Standards (1996, pp. 12–13):
“...empirical research suggests that there is no correlation at the aggregate
level between real-wage growth and the degree of observance of freedom-
of-association rights;
...there is no evidence that low-standards’ countries enjoy a better global
export performance than high-standards countries;
...a detailed analysis of US imports of textile products (for which competition
from low-standards countries is thought to be most intense) suggests that
imports from high- standards’ countries account for a large share of the US
market. Moreover, on average, the price of US imports of textile products
does not appear to be associated with the degree of enforcement of child
labour standards in exporting countries....’’
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While the studies cited above may not constitute the final word on the relation-
ships between labor standards and trade, the conclusion seems inescapable
that there is little compelling empirical evidence suggesting that low labor stan-
dards have an impact on trade.16
Labor standards and foreign direct investment (FDI)
It is often alleged that multinational enterprises may be attracted to locate in
countries with lower labor standards to take advantage of lower costs. The
available empirical evidence actually indicates the opposite to be the case.
Thus, Rodrik (1996) investigated the determinants of U.S. FDI abroad during
1982–89, including measures of foreign exchange distortions, population, and
income growth in host countries together with the various indicators of labor
standards. He found (p. 22) that countries that scored lower in guaranteeing
civil liberties and political rights and that had difficulty in providing for and en-
forcing standards affecting child labor have received less foreign investment
during 1982–89 than would have been predicted on the basis of other country
characteristics. Taken at face value, he concluded that these results indicate
that low labor standards may be a hindrance, rather than an attraction, for for-
eign investors. Aggarwal (1995, p. 7) reached a similar conclusion: “U.S. foreign
direct investment is not typically concentrated in countries or industries with
poor labor standards.’’ Finally, as reported in OECD (1996, p. 13): “...while core
labour standards may not be systematically absent from the location decisions
of OECD investors in favour of non-OECD destinations, aggregate FDI data sug-
gest that core labour standards are not important determinants in the majority
of cases.’’
Thus, the empirical evidence suggests rather convincingly that low labor stan-
dards are not reflected in the existing trade performance of the major developing
countries and that FDI is more attracted to countries with high rather than low
standards.
Labor standards and the role of interest groups
As mentioned above, there is a view that is widespread that support for in-
ternational labor standards reflects protectionist interests in the United States
and other industrialized countries. In an effort to test this proposition empiri-
cally, Krueger (1997) analyzed the determinants of support in the U.S. House of
Representatives for the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995. If this type of leg-
islation were approved, it could prohibit imports of goods produced abroad by
child labor under specified circumstances, including by children under 15 years
old and subject to a review of child labor practices by the U.S. Secretary of
Labor. The Act was co-sponsored by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Con-
gressman Barney Frank (D-MA), with 35 co-sponsors in the House and 7 in the
Senate. Krueger (p. 289) found that “...Congressmen from districts with a high
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concentration of high school dropouts are less likely to co-sponsor the Child
Labor Deterrence Act. ...This finding is contrary to what I would expect from
a simple political economy model....’’ Krueger also found that higher rates of
unionization were associated with support for the Act as were representatives
who were Democrats and also had voted against NAFTA and GATT.
In interpreting his results, Krueger (p. 293) suggested that the demand for
international child labor standards should be considered to be a “normal’’ good,
following Freeman (1994a). That is, voters with higher socioeconomic attain-
ment will select Congressmen who favor limitations on employment of child
labor. He further argued that unionized workers who tend to be more highly
skilled and thus may not benefit directly from a ban on imported goods made
with child labor may in this case be acting to pursue policies that strengthen
worker rights more generally rather than pursuing their own narrow self inter-
est. He goes on more broadly to state (pp. 293–94): “Indeed, in many instances
I am surprised that the AFL-CIO used its limited political capital to press for
international labor standards that are of little benefit to its members, when
instead it could pursue policies that are of much greater direct benefit to its
membership.’’17
While Krueger’s results are suggestive, they are by no means definitive. In
particular, as Srinivasan (1996, 1997) has noted, a representative may have cho-
sen not to sponsor the legislation and yet may be supportive of it. Further, since
less educated and less skilled individuals tend to vote less, their interests may
not have been given sufficient weight in the representative’s deciding whether
or not to be a cosponsor. Finally, Krueger’s results suggest support for the
legislation from representatives from districts with a higher rate of unionization
and voting records opposing NAFTA and GATT.
Another noteworthy empirical study is by Freeman (1993) who investigated
the evidence in developing countries for and against government intervention
designed to introduce/remove labor-market distortions and, alternatively, to
enhance labor-market institutions.18 He labels these two views, respectively,
the “World Bank Distortion View’’ and the “International Labour Organization
(ILO) Institutional View.’’ These views differ insofar as removing interventions
is believed to enhance economic efficiency and welfare in the former, whereas
in the latter introducing interventions is believed to lead to these same results.
To investigate the validity of these alternative views, Freeman examined evi-
dence on labor-market policies and institutions for selected developing coun-
tries mainly during the 1980s. His empirical findings suggest that neither the
distortion nor the institutional view is clearly supported by the available data.
In particular, real and relative wages in developing countries turned out to be
much more flexible in response to changing market conditions than the strict
distortionist view would suggest.19 Freeman’s overall conclusion was that the
costs and benefits of the labor-market policies that may be adopted will depend
on individual country circumstances.20
This selective review of labor standards and the role of interest groups sug-
gests some ambiguities with respect to the issues. While there may thus be
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scope for different views, in our judgment the weight of the theoretical and
empirical analysis does not justify taking an activist position to mandate and
enforce international labor standards.21 Nonetheless, because issues of labor
standards will continue to have a high profile in the current policy environment,
it is essential to consider the alternative arrangements that exist for their mon-
itoring and enforcement. This will be done in the following section. We will
conclude with some recommendations that may serve the interests and needs
of the United States and other high-income countries as well as the low-income
countries.
5. Monitoring and enforcement of labor standards
Labor standards are presently dealt with in a variety of settings: global; regional;
national/unilateral; and other, including private, arrangements. We shall discuss
briefly each of these in turn.
Global arrangements
The main international organization that is concerned with labor standards is
the ILO, which was established as part of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 fol-
lowing the end of World War I. The methods and principles set out in the ILO
constitution deal with all conceivable aspects of labor standards. As stated in
ILO (l988, p. 4), ILO action designed to promote and safeguard human rights
takes three main forms: (1) definition of rights, especially through adoption of
ILO Conventions and Recommendations; (2) measures to secure the realiza-
tion of rights, especially by means of international monitoring and supervision
but not by imposition of trade sanctions; and (3) assistance in implementing
measures, particularly through technical cooperation and advisory services.
We have already mentioned what might be considered to be ILO core labor
standards. It is interesting that formal ratification of ILO Conventions differs
considerably among ILO members, apparently because particular Conventions
may be at variance with national laws and institutional practices. Thus, for ex-
ample, as Rodrik (1996, pp. 15–16) notes, the United States has ratified only
11 ILO Conventions in all, whereas several other industrialized and developing
countries have ratified a significantly larger number. Ratification of ILO Conven-
tions may therefore not be an accurate indicator of existing national regulations
governing labor standards, and there are many cases in which ratified Conven-
tions are in fact not enforced.22
It is interesting in this connection, as Charnovitz (1987, pp. 566–567) has
noted, that issues of alleged unfair competition involving labor standards were
addressed in Article 7 of Chapter II of the 1948 (still-born) (Havana) Charter
of the International Trade Organization (ITO). Since the GATT was conceived
with a more narrow mandate as compared to the ITO, it did not address labor
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standards, except in Article XX(e) that provides for prohibition of goods made
with prison labor. Charnovitz (p. 574) notes further that as early as 1953 the
United States proposed (unsuccessfully) adding a labor standards article to
the GATT. This would have empowered GATT members to take measures against
other countries under the provisions of GATT Article XXIII (Nullification and Im-
pairment). The United States continued, again unsuccessfully, to push for ne-
gotiation of a GATT article on labor standards in both the Tokyo and Uruguay
Rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in the 1970s and 1980s. But the in-
ternational community was put on notice in April 1994 at the Marrakesh signing
of the Uruguay Round accords that the United States intended to pursue issues
of labor standards in future multilateral negotiations.
In the interim, there have been efforts at drafting a so-called social clause
dealing with core labor standards and including trade sanctions for noncompli-
ance that might eventually be incorporated into the WTO. As noted in Aggarwal
(1995, p. 38), in June 1994, the ILO began a research program dealing with the
integration of social welfare and trade policy. A central objective was to develop
a stronger enforcement mechanism. The ILO Secretariat proposed that the ILO
and WTO work jointly on the oversight of international core labor standards,
with the ILO concentrating on international monitoring and the WTO respon-
sible for enforcement by means of trade-related sanctions. But because of
disagreements among the country representatives of the ILO Working Party on
the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of International Trade, it was decided
in early 1995 to suspend further discussion of the use of trade sanctions for al-
leged noncompliance with core labor standards. Instead, as noted in OECD
(1996, p. 7), the ILO has undertaken a program of research on the effects of
trade liberalization on core standards and a review of ILO means of action for
the promotion of standards.
The United States, with some support from France and southern European
Union members, Canada, and Japan, nonetheless continued to pursue the is-
sue of trade and labor standards in the context of the WTO, and there was a
concerted effort to add the issue to the agenda for the WTO Ministerial Meeting
held in Singapore in December 1996.
In considering whether or not the WTO is an appropriate forum for dealing
with trade and alleged violations of core labor standards, it is pertinent to note
the conclusion reached in the OECD Report on Trade, Employment and Labour
Standards (1996, pp. 16–17):
“Existing WTO provisions have not been designed for promoting core stan-
dards. Some of the suggestions under discussion would imply a reinterpreta-
tion of WTO practices and procedures while others would require to a greater
or lesser extent renegotiation and amendment of WTO articles. Extending the
WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism procedure to include labour stan-
dards would fall into the former category while other proposals would fall
into the latter. In all cases, a consensus among WTO Members on the ap-
propriateness and effectiveness of using WTO procedures to promote core
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labor standards and on the institutional changes required would have to be
reached. Such a consensus does not exist at present. However, while some
countries continue to call for discussion of the issue in the WTO and others
are opposed, this remains an issue for international consideration. The de-
bate on this issue and on the associated conceptual and practical difficulties
will continue.’’23
Rodrik (1996) makes a case for using the Uruguay Round safeguard pro-
cedures for investigating complaints arising from imports from countries with
unacceptable labor standards that may be disruptive to domestic producing in-
terests. He stresses the need for including the views of consumers and public
interest groups in the importing countries as well as the views of foreign produc-
ers. Srinivasan (1996, 1997) has pointed out an important problem with Rodrik’s
argument, namely that there are all kinds of government regulations, besides
labor standards, that influence production costs (e.g., building codes and zon-
ing laws). Thus, in principle, objections might arise concerning imports that
may not conform to any one or more domestic regulations. Singling out labor
standards is then not convincing. It is not obvious, moreover, that the safe-
guard procedures, which are designed to be temporary, can be implemented
with the broad representation that Rodrik recommends. Finally, as Anderson
(1996) has observed, the U.S. experiences with antidumping and countervailing
duty procedures certainly suggest how difficult it may be to avoid the temporary
safeguard procedures from being captured by producing interests.
It is also worth noting that Freeman (1994a, p. 32) is somewhat inclined to
support the inclusion of labor standards in trade agreements:
“Unlike trade economists who view any interference with free trade as the
work of the devil, I would be pragmatic in this area. ...If trade negotiations
are the only way to raise forcefully the standards flag in an international set-
ting, why not? If trade sanctions can improve labor standards, that benefit
must be weighed against the cost of lost trade. If trade sanctions can over-
turn an evil dictatorial regime and save human lives, go for it. Perhaps the
standards issue will induce international trading groups to consider innova-
tive ways that international trade might be used to finance improvements in
standards.’’
Krueger (1997, p. 288) has expressed a similar view:
“Labor standards strike me as a legitimate subject of bargaining in trade ne-
gotiations. Presumably, a well-intentioned government will not accept an
agreement unless, in total, it is expected to make the country better off.
...Because the demand for labor standards tends to rise with national in-
come, many countries will choose on their own to strengthen and enforce
their standards following trade agreements.’’
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While the views expressed by Freeman and Krueger may be justified on prag-
matic and political grounds, there are better and less costly ways to effect
improvements in labor standards. There is also the further important question
of whether and how labor standards should be dealt with in the WTO multilateral
context. The welfare gains from trade liberalization have long been a central
feature of nondiscrimination in the GATT system. It would be a major departure
from precedent if countries with allegedly low labor standards were now to be
denied improved market access on these grounds.24
The debate on whether labor standards should be placed under the WTO’s
purview was apparently resolved in the negative at the December 1996 WTO
Ministerial Meeting. Thus, as reported by Williams in The Financial Times
(December 16, 1996, p. 4):
“Predictably hardest to resolve was the issue of labour standards, where
the U.S. threatened to veto the entire declaration if no mention was made.
Ministers eventually agreed to uphold internationally recognised core labour
standards,.... But trade sanctions to enforce them were rejected and there is
no provision for follow-up work in the WTO, which is asked simply to maintain
its (minimal) collaboration with the International Labour Organisation.’’
The U.S. position at the Singapore Ministerial Meeting could be interpreted in
part as pre-election posturing by the Democrats especially since the
Republicans have opposed linking labor standards and trade. Thus, the
Republican controlled 104th Congress was reluctant to grant fast-track ne-
gotiating authority to the Clinton Administration so long as the intention was to
include labor issues as part of any future trade negotiations.25 The Republican
opposition was continued in the first session of the 105th Congress in 1997, and
the Clinton Administration made an effort to mute its position on trade and la-
bor standards in order to induce Republicans to approve fast-track negotiating
authority. However organized labor, environmental interest groups, and human
rights organizations mounted an intensive campaign to oppose fast track unless
the legislation included explicit protection of labor rights and the environment.26
When it became clear in mid-November 1997 that there were insufficient Demo-
cratic votes to obtain fast-track approval in the House of Representatives, the
legislation was withdrawn and presumably will be reintroduced in 1998. The
link between trade and labor standards will therefore remain a highly visible
and controversial issue of public discourse on future trade legislation.
Regional arrangements
European union. Issues of worker rights have been a focus of attention in
the European Union (EU) because of concerns over low-wage competition from
some EU member countries, persistent unemployment, and wage stagnation.
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Sapir (1995b) notes that the first efforts to address the harmonization of social
policies in Europe can be traced back to early stages of European integration
prior to 1958. According to De Boer and Winham (1993, p. 17), the issue of a
Community-wide Social Charter was first broached in 1972. Subsequently, with
the issuance in 1985 of the white paper signaling the intention to remove re-
maining barriers to trade and creation of a Single Market, a Community Charter
of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers was drafted in 1988. This Charter,
which is quite comprehensive and encompasses the “core’’ and “other’’ labor
standards noted in our earlier discussion,27 was adopted by all EU members
except the United Kingdom. It was hoped to incorporate the Social Charter
into the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991, but this was opposed once again
by Britain. The Social Charter was subsequently approved by the other 11 EU
members, but on a voluntary basis and not as part of the Maastricht Treaty.28
In his evaluation of the EU Social Charter, Sapir (1995a, pp. 742–743; 1996)
concluded that harmonization of social policies was not a pre-condition of suc-
cessful European trade liberalization and integration. He noted further that:
“In the mid-1990s, differences in labour standards between member states re-
main substantial and ‘social harmonisation’ remains a distant reality. ...what-
ever harmonisation has been achieved in Europe, it could not have occurred
without redistributive mechanisms between countries. In the absence of such
mechanisms, the harmonisation of social policies cannot be contemplated
internationally.’’29
NAFTA
At the time that NAFTA was being negotiated, some observers urged that NAFTA
include a Social Charter for North America as a possible means of protecting the
interests of workers.30 Instead of including a Social Charter, however, and since
the NAFTA had already been signed by the member countries in the summer
of 1992, the newly elected Clinton Administration opted to pursue a separate
side agreement covering labor issues as well as an agreement covering envi-
ronmental issues.31 Aggarwal (1995, p. 34) has summarized the main features
of the labor side agreement as follows:
“First, the NAFTA supplemental agreement contains a more comprehensive
list of labor standards than the five typically present in U.S. trade programs
[which are noted below]. The agreement commits each party to the pro-
motion of eleven broad labor conditions ranging from freedom of associa-
tion to migration policies. Second, the agreement does not attempt to apply
U.S. standards or...common uniform criteria in its evaluation of labor condi-
tions in other countries. Instead, the agreement contains different enforce-
ment mechanisms for different standards. The complaint process consists of
three stages—filing a petition with the domestic National Administrative Office
(NAO), Ministerial consultations, and lastly consultation with the Evaluation
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Committee of Experts (ECE). Complaints pertaining to freedom of associ-
ation, the right of collective bargaining, and/or the right to strike can only
be taken to the second stage of the complaint process. More importantly,
sanctions cannot be utilized to encourage enforcement of laws pertaining to
these rights. Of the eleven labor principles, only the implementation of those
pertaining to child labor, minimum employment standards, and occupational
health and safety can be supported by sanctions.’’32
Because it required some time to establish the institutional framework fol-
lowing the implementation of NAFTA in January 1994, there has been limited
experience to date in administering the labor side agreement. As of November
1997, the U.S. NAO has received seven submissions alleging non-compliance
by Mexico with its labor laws. These submissions have involved issues of
freedom of association being denied to Mexican workers. No action was rec-
ommended on two submissions, the third was withdrawn, and the others are
pending. Mexico has received one submission about U.S. noncompliance with
its labor laws, involving closure of a subsidiary of the Sprint Corporation in San
Francisco. This case is pending.
It is interesting to ask whether the NAFTA labor side agreement might serve as
a model for a global agreement that might in the future be incorporated into the
WTO or into an expanded NAFTA. As far as a global agreement is concerned,
the NAFTA side agreement goes beyond what are considered to be core labor
standards and emphasizes the observance of existing national laws governing
labor standards in the NAFTA member countries rather than the intercountry
harmonization of these laws that proponents of labor standards favor. Further,
not all standards are subject to sanctions and those that are (i.e., child labor,
minimum employment standards, and occupational safety and health) are pre-
cisely ones that have engendered much of the ongoing controversy in the global
context. Whether an agreement on labor rights and standards should be made
a condition of expanding NAFTA to include Chile and other nations in the West-
ern Hemisphere also appears problematic in our view on both conceptual and
empirical grounds. We recognize of course that if future Congressional approval
of fast-track negotiating authority is to be obtained, it almost certainly will have
to acknowledge the importance of labor standards. But, in our view, the ne-
gotiating authority should stress the desirability of enhancing labor standards
as an objective to be sought by sovereign nations and that trade sanctions not
be used to impose labor standards on low income countries that may not be
appropriate for their economic circumstances.
National/unilateral arrangements
As noted in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (1996, p. 229), since the 1980s it has
become increasingly common to include international labor standards criteria
in U.S. foreign economic legislation.33 The most important of these actions
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have been in establishing eligibility for trade preferences in the 1983 Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act and the 1984 renewal of the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP), and making the foreign denial of worker rights actionable
under Section 301 of the 1988 Trade Act. The 1988 Trade Act also expanded the
requirements of the Departments of State and Labor to submit periodic reports
to Congress on human rights abuses and foreign adherence to internationally
recognized worker rights. The stipulations on labor standards in the GSP were
made mandatory. GSP eligibility has in fact been revoked at times for a number
of developing countries until they showed evidence that the offending actions
had been or were in the process of being eliminated. Apparently prompted by
the U.S. experience, the EU has adopted similar labor standards criteria for its
GSP program to become effective in 1998.
While there may be instances in which countries have improved their labor
standards in order to maintain GSP eligibility, these cases may not be important
economically, considering the size of the countries involved and the limited
benefits that the GSP offers because of the restricted product coverage. Also, in
the future the value of GSP will be eroded as the result of implementing the tariff
reductions negotiated in the Uruguay Round. Nonetheless, it may appear that
the experiences with quid-pro-quo actions under the GSP program can possibly
provide some useful insights into the design and implementation of policies
and procedures governing trade-linked labor standards in other contexts. This
may be misleading, however, since the removal of GSP eligibility is essentially
decided unilaterally by the United States and the EU, both of which are obviously
very powerful entities in the global trading system.34 Unilateral U.S. action can
also be taken under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act. One should be wary
therefore of arrangements in which developing countries may be coerced into
taking actions detrimental to their own interests in response to pressures from
their more powerful trading partners.35
Other arrangements
There are a number of other arrangements that deserve mention in addition to
those already discussed above.
For example, as noted in OECD (1996, pp. 161–69), the OECD, ILO, UNICEF,
and other UN agencies have been active in promoting cooperative programs of
economic development in which practical measures backed up often by mul-
tilateral and bilateral financial assistance can be devised to deal with some
of the underlying causes of poverty in poor countries that may be reflected in
the employment of children and the absence or relatively weak enforcement
of core labor standards. The OECD and ILO have also developed international
codes of conduct applicable to multinational enterprises (MNEs) that may assist
in improving labor standards and working conditions in MNE affiliates in host
developing countries. Individual firms can attempt to develop codes of con-
duct on their own, as Aggarwal (1995, p. 39) has noted has been done by such
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U.S. MNEs as Levi Strauss, Liz Claiborne, Nike, Reebok, Sears, Timberland,
and Walmart. These cooperative efforts and codes of conduct are essentially
voluntary in nature, and, of course, there is no guarantee that they will be effec-
tive in all circumstances in low-income countries, as some firms have already
discovered. Nonetheless, they serve an important role insofar as they help to
focus attention on the importance of the root causes of underdevelopment and
the types of business practices that may help low-income countries to raise per
capita incomes and improve conditions of work.
Finally, we may reiterate the importance of consumer labeling in providing
a market-based method for helping to improve labor standards when these
standards can be treated as private goods. The advantage of labeling is that it
provides information about production processes being used and allows con-
sumers in making their consumption choices to reflect the satisfaction that they
derive from the presumed realization of higher labor standards internationally.36
When labor standards are considered to be public goods, there will be a need
for governmental policies. What is important is that these various private and
public actions can be carried out without the coercion that may be involved
when efforts are made internationally to influence governments to change their
domestic labor-market policies.37
6. Conclusions and implications for policy
The motivation for this paper has been to consider whether international labor
standards should be incorporated into the rules and mandate of the WTO which
oversees the international trading system and into U.S. trade policies and trade
agreements. A case could possibly be made for devising WTO rules and dis-
ciplines to improve core labor standards in low-income countries and, by the
same token, to prevent the United States and other high-income countries from
abusing their economic power in seeking measures that would be detrimental
to the cost competitiveness and economic welfare of low- income countries.38
However, it is difficult in our view to make this case convincingly because of the
diversity of labor standards in countries with differing national characteristics,
policies, and institutions. Furthermore, our literature review suggests that there
are no compelling theoretical and empirical grounds to support the international
enforcement and harmonization of labor standards.39
What then should be done on the global level? Issues of international labor
standards have historically been the province of the ILO, which is often criti-
cized because it lacks a mechanism for enforcement of discipline to raise labor
standards and because it espouses an interventionist social agenda. While
these criticisms may be true, they miss the point in our judgment. There is
ample evidence especially from the economies in East and Southeast Asia that
labor standards and social conditions are improved as countries achieve higher
levels of economic development and per capita incomes. If so, then what is
needed are policies to provide technical and financial assistance to promote
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economic progress and the accompanying realization of higher labor standards
in low-income countries.
With sufficient encouragement and increased financial support, the ILO can
provide a multilateral forum that would serve to strengthen its role and authority
in pursuing improved labor standards internationally. While the United States
and many of the EU member countries wanted to link labor standards and trade
in the December 1996 WTO Ministerial Meeting, we noted that their efforts were
unsuccessful. The challenge then is to reinforce the institutional role for which
the ILO has been designed.40
If the responsibility for monitoring and helping developing countries to im-
prove their labor standards is centered in the ILO, there is no obvious case
to be made for the United States to incorporate labor standards issues into
its trade policies and trade agreements. We recognize that adherence to cer-
tain specified labor standards has been made a condition in U.S. preferential
trade arrangements, especially in the GSP arrangements and in the labor side
agreement in the NAFTA. There is not much evidence, however, that actual or
threatened withdrawal of GSP has had much impact on developing country la-
bor standards. Further, the actions initiated to date under the NAFTA labor side
agreement have primarily involved alleged noncompliance with the right of free-
dom of association. Our review of the empirical evidence on labor standards
and U.S. trade suggests that there is no case to be made that ostensibly low
foreign labor standards are harmful to American firms and workers. Moreover,
foreign direct investment appears to be more attracted to countries with high
rather than low labor standards. Thus, as already stated, U.S. policies should be
directed to maintaining open markets and encouraging the economic growth of
its developing country trading partners. This is the surest way to achieve higher
labor standards since there is pervasive evidence that standards are improved
with higher levels of per capita incomes. U.S. policies in support of the activities
of the ILO would also be helpful in providing inducements and technical and
financial assistance to developing countries in raising their standards.41
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Notes
1. According to OECD (1996, pp. 31–34), there are seven fundamental ILO Conventions that form
the basis of consensus among the ILO’s constituents. These include: prohibition of forced
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labour (No. 29); freedom of association and protection of the right to organize (No. 87); right to
organize and collective bargaining (No. 98); equal remuneration for men and women for work
of equal value (No. 100); abolition of forced labour (No. 105); nondiscrimination in employment
and occupation (No. 111); and minimum age of employment of children (No. 138).
2. See Brown et al. (1996, Appendix Table 1) for the definitions and principles of the core and
other labor standards that are articulated in U.S. trade law, based on Lyle (1991, pp. 20–31).
3. See, for example, Reich (1994).
4. A similar argument is made by Srinivasan (1994, 1995, 1996, 1997), who argues that human-
itarian concerns need to be reflected in the willingness of citizens in developed countries to
assume responsibility and pay financially to enhance the welfare of workers, including children,
in developing countries.
5. Srinivasan points out that the case for promoting labor unions and collective bargaining, which
is considered to be a core labor standard, is by no means obvious in many developing countries,
especially where unions are concentrated in the organized manufacturing and public sectors
rather than in agriculture where a relatively large proportion of the population may be employed.
6. See Bloom and Noor (1994) for research along related lines. Casella (1996) develops a model in
which labor standards respond endogenously to changing levels of income. Further theoretical
analysis of labor standards is to be found in Golub (1997), Maskus (1997), and OECD (1996,
pp. 215–232).
7. An exception arises here in cases of slave labor and what may be considered to be egregious
treatment of child labor.
8. See Maskus, Rutherford, and Selby (1996) for a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
analyzing the effects of changes in Mexico’s labor standards. They demonstrate conditions
in which improved labor standards may enhance the welfare of Mexican workers. See also
Maskus (1997).
9. But it is important to be clear that concern about labor standards ought to be motivated by
concern for the workers involved, and not for the workers with whom they compete. It is this
latter view that motivates many of the advocates of labor standards. What these advocates may
not realize or acknowledge is that taking actions against alleged violators of labor standards will
normally make the “exploited’’ workers worse off, not better off. That will be true whether the
sanctions are applied by government policy or by individual consumers responding to labeling.
Therefore, if we wish to make workers and their families better off, we must find a way to raise
their incomes, not take their incomes away.
10. However, as just noted, labeling does not in itself raise the incomes of foreign workers and their
families.
11. Freeman’s argument for consumer labeling may therefore be limited insofar as it rests on treating
labor standards as private goods. He does not make clear, moreover, what role the government
should play, if any, in providing information to consumers and facilitating labeling and preventing
private labeling arrangements from being co-opted by producing interests.
12. It should be noted that this discussion refers to national or federal standards. John H. Jackson
has pointed out to us that there may be significant differences between U.S. states and regions
in the impacts that national standards may have and yet the national standards remain operative.
What helps this to work is that there is free movement of labor within the United States coupled
with various programs of income support and transfers. As noted in the theoretical discussion
above, one or both of these elements would be needed for an international system of labor
standards to function effectively.
13. While Krueger’s characterization may apply to unions and import-competing firms, it may not
apply to the activities of human-rights and public-interest groups which are not motivated by
protectionist considerations.
14. See Noor (1996) for development of a theoretical model in which labor standards may en-
hance protection in an industrialized country. Also, see T.N. Srinivasan’s comment on Stern
(1997).
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15. Aggarwal also had occasion to note that: the impact of imports from developing countries
is small relative to imports from industrialized countries; countries with lower labor standards
do not exhibit higher rates of import penetration than countries with relatively higher labor
standards; and imports from developing countries do not appear to have larger displacement
effects on U.S. employment and wages in sectors associated with poor labor standards relative
to other sectors.’’ See also Erickson and Mitchell (1996) who focus on the pattern and labor
content of U.S. trade and find relatively small adverse wage effects and displacement of U.S.
workers.
16. Alan Krueger has suggested to us that this is consistent with his view that the demand for inter-
national labor standards in the United States does not emanate from disguised protectionism.
On this matter, however, see the discussion below of Krueger’s research.
17. Krueger also examined other aspects of child labor, including the relationship between em-
ployment of children and GDP per capita and the experiences with compulsory schooling laws.
He found that employment of young children was negatively related to GDP per capita. That
is, child labor is more prevalent in low-income regions and negligible in high-income regions.
This is a clear demonstration of the fact that restrictions on child labor can be looked at as a
normal good, in this case less of it being condoned as per capita incomes rise. Evidence on the
effects of compulsory schooling laws suggested that there may be definite benefits from such
laws in high-income countries, but that there is widespread noncompliance with existing laws in
many low-income countries. These findings suggest that reliance on child labor in low-income
countries will diminish as family incomes rise, and that realization of the benefits of compulsory
schooling laws depends on increasing economic opportunities and financial support for poor
families so as to reduce their dependence on employment of their children.
18. See also Freeman (1994b) which contains empirical studies of labor-market institutions and
policies in several industrialized countries and some lessons for the United States suggested
by the experiences of other countries.
19. See Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput (1997) for data on real minimum wages for selected devel-
oping countries for 1970–1990 and for an analysis of how noncompliance with official minimum
wages may reduce distortionary costs.
20. Linda Lim in commenting on Stern (1997) has pointed out that, in spite of the absence of for-
mal worker rights and standards in such Southeast Asian countries as Malaysia, Singapore,
and Indonesia, wages and working conditions have improved markedly. In contrast, the ex-
periences in Thailand and the Philippines have been much less favorable even though these
nations encouraged worker rights and minimum wages. She also noted that both Malaysia and
Singapore have attracted considerable inflows of FDI and that workers have benefited in the
firms involved. See also the comment by Mari Pangestu and evidence on Indonesian economic
growth and accompanying improvement in social indicators noted in IMF (1997).
21. There is evidently a marked difference in world view between most advocates of labor standards
and trade (and most other) economists. Labor advocates seem to see the world in terms of a
struggle between capital and labor for the rewards from production, without much regard to the
size of the output that they will have to share. They see the outcome as depending on power,
not on economics. Trade economists see the world in terms of how resources are allocated to
production with a view to maximizing the total output. They see the distribution of that output
between capital and labor as depending on scarcity and productivity, not on power. Therefore
labor advocates favor the use of intervention to tilt the balance of power in favor of labor,
believing then that labor will get a larger share of a fixed pie. Trade economists see those same
policies as shrinking the pie while altering the slices not by changing power but by changing
the markets within which scarcity determines the rewards to capital and labor.
22. A detailed discussion of the observance of core labor standards in 75 selected countries is
provided in OECD (1996, pp. 39–70).
23. John Martin has suggested to us that since the WTO has already been assigned a role in
dealing with trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) as a result of the Uruguay Round
negotiations, it may be reasonable to include labor standards in the WTO as well. In our view,
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the inclusion of TRIPs in the WTO can be considered as an effort by the industrialized countries
to capture the monopoly rents associated with intellectual property rights and thus ostensibly to
prevent the “piracy’’ of these rights. This is a very different matter from dealing with intercountry
differences in labor standards which may reflect variations in per capita income levels and a
host of structural and institutional factors.
24. Our point therefore is not that we see the recommendations of Freeman and Krueger as “the
work of the devil.’’ Rather, we do not consider trade agreements and trade sanctions to be an
effective and equitable means for raising international labor standards.
25. See, for example, U.S. House of Representatives (1995).
26. Thus, as reported by Greenhouse in The New York Times, February 20, 1997, p. C3: “Putting the
labor movement on a potential collision course with President Clinton, AFL-CIO leaders voted
“...to oppose extending the North American Free Trade Agreement to other countries unless
it includes protections on labor and the environment that the Administration has previously
rejected.’’ This is a good example of the point we made earlier that advocates of labor standards
apparently care more about protecting their own interests rather than the interests of supposedly
exploited foreign workers.
27. The highlights of the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights are summarized in De Boer and
Winham (1993, pp. 36–37), and the full text is to be found in Commission of the European
Communities (1990).
28. It is interesting to note, with the advent of a Labor Government in the United Kingdom in the
May 1, 1997 election, that Britain has indicated that it will give its approval to the Social Charter
and thus will no longer be the only EU member country not to accept the Charter.
29. For information on the degree of convergence (or lack of it) between the EU and the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA) on labor standards, see the chapter on “Labour Standards and Economic
Integration’’ in OECD (1994).
30. A useful reference is Lemco and Robson (1993).
31. At the time, the negotiation of these side agreements may have been helpful in obtaining Con-
gressional approval of the NAFTA. However, as we note below, the resort to such side agree-
ments does not carry over necessarily to other regional or multilateral trade agreements.
32. See also OECD (1996, pp. 178–183).
33. The standards include: (1) freedom of association; (2) the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively; (3) freedom from forced labor; (4) a minimum age for employment; and (5) acceptable
conditions of work, including a minimum wage, limitations on hours of work, and occupational
safety and health rights in the workplace.
34. Further discussion of labor standards and trade preferences can be found in OECD (1996,
pp. 182–190).
35. Srinivasan (1997) characterizes the GSP as “crumbs from the rich man’s table which the devel-
oping countries should do well without.’’
36. Aggarwal (1995, pp. 39–40) cites the example of the Child Labor Coalition, which was formed
in 1989 by several religious, human rights, and union groups for the purpose of informing
consumers in high-income countries about child labor conditions used in producing goods
such as rugs in South Asia. The Coalition has sponsored the so-called Rugmark campaign
which provides producers with a certifying label that they can attach to their exports indicating
that they do not employ child labor. According to de Jonquieres and Williams (1996), the United
States has proposed in the ILO that the Rugmark labeling system be extended to clothing and
other products. See also U.S. Department of Labor (1996) for a report on codes of conduct
for the U.S. apparel industry based on a survey of 42 companies and visits to six countries
that are major apparel exporters to the U.S. market. These voluntary codes of conduct in the
apparel industry have become increasingly common since the early 1990s, although monitoring
and enforcement of the codes often present difficulties in many instances. The most recent
example is the U.S. Presidential task force agreement to “end’’ apparel sweatshops worldwide
and give a seal of approval to companies that comply with the code of conduct. For details,
see Greenhouse in The New York Times, April 9, 1997, p. A11.
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37. But again note that worker and family incomes may not be raised if their effective labor supply
is reduced by the various private/public actions.
38. Bernard Hoekman has suggested to us that some existing features in the WTO such as the
agreements on pre-shipment inspection and trade-related intellectual property rights could be
helpful in facilitating the provision of information to international traders and consumers.
39. We would take issue therefore with the point made in the OECD Report (1996, p. 14) that: “Even
though efforts to improve observance of core labour standards may be facilitated by economic
growth and freer trade, there are reasons to doubt that market forces alone will automatically
improve the standards. Hence, the importance of more direct promotion mechanisms.’’ The key
words here are “automatically’’ and “direct.’’ As we have tried to make clear in our discussion
and as Srinivasan also notes in his comment on Stern (1997), it may well be that labor-market
failures are present in many countries. But if this is the case, the optimal policies are domestic
in character, and it is by no means obvious why international policies are preferred and how
they can better overcome the domestic market failures at issue.
40. In considering the spectrum of international organizations that have been created over the years,
Srinivasan (1995, 1997) points out that these organizations have been specialized according to
function. For example, he notes the particular rules and mandates that apply to such organi-
zations as the: ILO; GATT/WTO; UNCTAD; World Bank; International Monetary Fund; Universal
Postal Union; and Berne and Paris conventions. The issue then is whether it is desirable and
efficient to require that individual organizations assume responsibilities for rules for which the
organizations were not designed. More specifically, he argues that issues of labor standards
are best left to the ILO and should not be mandated to the GATT/WTO, which has been de-
signed to articulate, monitor, and enforce the rules governing the international trading system.
For similar views, see Bhagwati (1995), Charnovitz (1995), and Pangestu (1996).
Some observers might take issue with the above characterization of the GATT/WTO, arguing
that it constitutes a forum for discussion and negotiation on trade-related matters, and, in this
light, should include issues of labor standards. But even if this were the case, there is a genuine
possibility that the WTO could become overloaded if it were to take on labor standards as well
as other new issues like the environment and competition policy.
41. See Charnovitz (1995) for suggestions for reinvigorating the ILO and for changes especially in
U.S. policies that would serve to strengthen the ILO.
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